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In ecology, the grouping of species into functional groups has played a valuable role in simplifying ecological
complexity. In epidemiology, further clarifications of epidemiological functions are needed: while host roles may be
defined, they are often used loosely, partly because of a lack of clarity on the relationships between a host’s
function and its epidemiological role. Here we focus on the definition of bridge hosts and their epidemiological
consequences. Bridge hosts provide a link through which pathogens can be transmitted from maintenance host
populations or communities to receptive populations that people want to protect (i.e., target hosts). A bridge host
should (1) be competent for the pathogen or able to mechanically transmit it; and (2) come into direct contact or
share habitat with both maintenance and target populations. Demonstration of bridging requires an operational
framework that integrates ecological and epidemiological approaches. We illustrate this framework using the
example of the transmission of Avian Influenza Viruses across wild bird/poultry interfaces in Africa and discuss a
range of other examples that demonstrate the usefulness of our definition for other multi-host systems. Bridge
hosts can be particularly important for understanding and managing infectious disease dynamics in multi-host
systems at wildlife/domestic/human interfaces, including emerging infections.Table of contents
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1. A functional approach to disease ecology
Ecological functional approaches classify organisms ac-
cording to what they do, and/or what they eat. They
offer an alternative perspective to taxonomic classifica-
tions for identifying trends within and making sense of
ecological complexity. Applications of functional group
concepts, which date back to fundamental ideas about* Correspondence: alexandre.caron@cirad.fr
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/biomass distributions across different trophic levels [1],
have been crucial in advancing ecological understand-
ing. More recently, ecological functional analyses have
achieved prominence as a way of linking taxonomic
survey data and the provision of ecosystem services [2].
Functional analyses thus remain an important research
area in ecology.
In epidemiology, functional concepts have clear po-
tential utility but are still in a relatively early stage of
development. Classical epidemiology relies heavily on
single-species studies, particularly those of people (e.g.,
analyses of measles and smallpox in human populations
[3]). In contemporary epidemiological studies, in the
last fifteen years, under the influence of ecology, the
scope of epidemiology is being broadened to include
plant and animal communities in which multiple differ-
ent species can contribute to the maintenance and
spread of pathogens in host populations [4]. In multi-
host systems, the role played by each host population
in pathogen dynamics is determined by the species’
competence for the pathogen (i.e., its receptivity to in-
fection and its capacity to replicate and transmit the
pathogen [5]), its exposure to the pathogen determined
by the host ecology/behaviour and its interactions withticle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
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borne infections) leading to infectious contacts, and fi-
nally, the composition of the host community that will
determine the range of inter-host interactions [6].
One of the central questions in disease ecology is that
of how the community composition of potential host
species relates to the dynamics of pathogen transmission
within the host community, as opposed to within a
population of a single species. The complexity of this
problem can be simplified by assigning epidemiological
functions to relevant traits that define an organism’s role
in the epidemiology of a given pathogen. For example,
animals that undertake long movements (a trait) may
contribute to the epidemiological function (pathogen
disperser) of spreading pathogens over large distances
(a role). Grouping organisms by epidemiological func-
tions facilitates the development of eco-epidemiological
models for a given pathogen in relation to an entire
animal community [7]. This approach could potentially
play an important role in guiding research, as well as in
the surveillance and control of animal and zoonotic dis-
eases [8].
Although some progress has been made in the
characterization of epidemiological functional groups,
(e.g., clear definition of the maintenance function [9,10]),
other epidemiological functions remain incompletely de-
fined, especially those relating to the transmission of path-
ogens between groups of hosts. In this paper we first
define the transmission function in relation to the main-
tenance function. We then focus on the concept of “bridge
hosts” and demonstrate their potential importance in the
ecology of disease transmission in multi-host systems.
Though closely related concepts have been used previ-
ously [10-12], we believe that a refined definition embed-
ded in a clear functional framework is still lacking. Lastly,
we present an operational framework to identify potential
bridge host populations, using as a case study the ecology
of avian influenza viruses at the wild/domestic bird inter-
face in Africa and also giving other multi-host systems
examples.
2. Transmission function and bridge host
We use “host” to refer to a host population, a host spe-
cies, or a host community. The smallest epidemiological
unit to which we will refer is a host population, acknow-
ledging the fact that individual variability can also substan-
tially impact pathogen transmission (e.g. “superspreader”,
[13]). As defined by Haydon et al. [10] and more recently
revised by Viana et al. [9], a conceptual framework for the
role of hosts in epidemiology requires the definition of the
target host: “the population of concern to the observer” in
the geographic area under study (Table 1). A maintenance
host will only be relevant to a target population if it can
be in contact with and able to transmit the infection to it.The maintenance function represents the capacity to
maintain the pathogen within the ecosystem. A mainten-
ance host is a host population (single population) or com-
munity/host complex (several sympatric host populations)
“in which the pathogen persists even in the complete
absence of transmission from other hosts” [12]. The main-
tenance function depends on host density, and on intra-
and inter-host infectious contacts (i.e., a contact leading to
infection amongst other intra-host factors; [14]). In multi-
host systems, the notion of a maintenance community in
which several populations from different species play a
role in the maintenance of the pathogen seems more ap-
propriate than the “reservoir” concept [11,15] for under-
standing pathogen dynamics. The reservoir concept is still
being used in contradictory ways, as discussed by several
authors [10-12]. Haydon et al. [10] extended the definition
of reservoir by adding “source populations” that may not
be involved in the maintenance of the pathogen but rather
in the transmission of the pathogen to the target popula-
tion. Ashford [11] defined a “liaison host” as linking the
reservoir to another host population, with no explicit ref-
erence to target populations. We agree with Ashford [11]
that source population should not be included in the def-
inition of the reservoir, as this term is strongly linked to
the concept of maintenance and because control of infec-
tion in the reservoir would be different if targeted at the
maintenance or source populations. For example, aiming
at controlling the infection in a maintenance vs. a source
population might have different outcomes, since the main-
tenance host could still re-infect the source population in
the latter case. To add to the confusion, Suzán et al. [16]
presented a new framework to understand patterns in
space and time of meta-communities of hosts and para-
sites. In their first figure they display in red “reservoir
species” and in orange “alternative hosts”, together “main-
taining higher infection of prevalence”. Clearly, their con-
cept of “reservoir” differs from that of Haydon et al. [10],
who argued that any host involved in the maintenance of
the pathogen should be part of the reservoir. The difference
in definitions is identical with Plowright et al. [17]: they
present domestic horses as potential source populations
(defined in the article as “recipient” and “intermediate
hosts”) of Hendra viruses for human populations without
considering them as part of the reservoir (presented as the
bat community). The extensive use of the “reservoir” con-
cept under multiple definitions and the lack of consensus
around the liaison host and source population concepts
(revealed by the scarcity of use of these two last terms
in the literature) requires a refined conceptual frame-
work and definitions. Agreeing with others [11,12], we
thus prefer to use only maintenance host or commu-
nity, a term that refers better to the dynamic aspect
of the functional role than the static notion of a
reservoir [6,18].
Table 1 Role of hosts in pathogen epidemiology and their participation in maintenance and transmission functions
Role of hosts
in pathogen
epidemiology
Definition or related definition for the case of
bridge host
Maintenance
Function
Transmission
Function
Examples
Target host - The population of concern to the observer [10] X - Human populations
(for zoonoses)
- Domestic populations
- Threatened wildlife species
Maintenance
host population
- Hosts in which the pathogen persists even in the
complete absence of transmission from other hosts [12]
X (X) - Brush-tailed possums for bovine
tuberculosis in New Zealand [12]
- Population larger than the critical community size
(i.e. size under which the pathogen cannot be maintained
in the community) in which the pathogen persists [10]
- White-footed mouse (Peromyscus
leucopus) for Lyme disease in the
United States [6]
Maintenance
host community/
Maintenance
host complex
- One or more epidemiologically connected populations or
environments in which the pathogen can be permanently
maintained [10]
X (X) - Anatids for avian influenza
viruses worldwide [24]
- Any host complex in which disease persists indefinitely is
a reservoir [12]
- Amphibian sp. for the trematode
Ribeiroia ondatrae [18]
- Host for which cross species transmission and inter-species
transmission are high [14]
Bridge host - Non-maintenance host population able to transmit a
pathogen from a maintenance host/complex to the target
population, otherwise not or loosely connected to the
maintenance complex (this manuscript)
X
Previous related definitions: - Little studied so far
- Source population: any population that transmits infection
directly to the target population [10]
- Red deer and domestic pigs
for bovine tuberculosis in
New Zealand [12]?
- Liaison host: incidental hosts that transmit pathogens
from a reservoir to another incidental host [11,15]
- Peri-domestic birds such as
swallow sp., sparrow sp., etc. [23]
- Spatial vector: host that transport the pathogen to target
populations in new locations [12]
- Temporal vector: host that can transmit the pathogen
to target species across temporal scale [12]
Crosses in brackets indicate that maintenance host can participate in the transmission function although this is not a necessary condition.
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and its link with the maintenance function have been
properly defined, the function of pathogen transmission
to the target host needs a clearer definition. Interspecific
pathogen transmission is of crucial importance for infec-
tious disease management. Disease control can target
the maintenance host to stop pathogen maintenance and
circulation in the ecosystem (i.e. targeting the mainten-
ance function); however, as this option is often unfeas-
ible (for practical or ethical reasons, notably concerning
wildlife populations), one could also try to break the
transmission pathway that brings the pathogen to the
target host. We therefore define the transmission func-
tion as the capacity to transmit the pathogen to the tar-
get host. This function must be separated from the
maintenance function, as the maintenance host does not
always have infectious contact with the target host.
When it has direct contact with the target host, then the
maintenance host is implicated in the maintenance and
transmission functions. When it does not, a bridge host(Table 1) can connect (i.e., have infectious contact with)
both maintenance and target hosts, “bridging” the gap
between them. Using this functional definition, the con-
cept of the reservoir as revisited by Haydon et al. [10]
and more recently by Viana et al. [9], does not refer
clearly to a single epidemiological function, because it
includes maintenance host(s) involved in the mainten-
ance function and potentially in the transmission func-
tion as well as non-maintenance population(s) only
involved in the transmission function. Allocating hosts
belonging to the reservoir to specific functional groups
that surveillance and/or control can target is therefore
difficult and provides an additional reason to focus solely
on the maintenance-target hosts.
Bridge host is therefore used, since (i) the group is dis-
tinct from the source population, as bridge hosts do not
belong to the maintenance host/community, and the li-
aison host as a bridge host is always in reference to a
maintenance-target population system; and (ii) the word
“bridge” is relevant to the definition proposed (e.g. [19]).
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form the same epidemiological function for a pathogen
that can be targeted by specific surveillance and control
interventions. In Suzán et al. [16], information about
whether alternative hosts function as bridge hosts would
add an important layer of information to their frame-
work and contribute to the understanding of the spatial
spread of parasites.
Our bridge host definition is closely related to the
“spatial and temporal vector” concepts presented by
Nugent [12] but unifies them with previous definitions
(see above) and broadens them. A bridge host can be de-
fined at the level of a population or a community. Bridge
hosts may be frequent in disease ecology, but this term
has not been explicitly defined and its usage is not com-
mon when referring to the transmission function with-
out any role in maintenance function. For example, it
would be incorrect to use the term “bridge species” as
the role of a bridge host would refer to a specific host
population in interaction with other hosts in a given
ecosystem (e.g. contact with maintenance or target pop-
ulations) and at a specific density [12]; the host density
and the network of interaction between these hosts in
another ecosystem would likely be different and would
make it unlikely that a species can play the same epi-
demiological functional role across its range.
A clearer conceptual framework is thus needed to
guide the identification of bridge hosts and the charac-
terisation of their roles in disease ecology. This frame-
work must also be operationalised if it is to guide the
design of hypotheses that can be tested through field
protocols to characterise the role(s) of hosts in disease
ecology.
Using the different target-maintenance systems pro-
posed by Haydon et al. [10], bridge hosts can be in-
cluded in target-bridge-maintenance systems in several
ways (Figure 1). According to our definition, a bridge
host is involved in the transmission function while not
involved in the maintenance function. Two main prereq-
uisites must be fulfilled for a host to qualify as a bridge
host. The first prerequisite is that the host must be compe-
tent for the pathogen (i.e., must be receptive to infection,
permit pathogen replication, and be able to excrete it)
without being able to maintain it alone, in which case the
host would be considered as a maintenance host; or alter-
natively, the host should be able to mechanically transport
the pathogen [20,21]. Its competence will influence the
capacity of a bridge host to achieve the transmission func-
tion: if the bridge host has a short pathogen excretion
period, it will be able to transmit the pathogen to a target
population only if the time lag between contact with a
maintenance and then a target host is shorter than the ex-
cretion period, or if the distance between target and main-
tenance is shorter than the maximum distance that thebridge host can travel during its excretion phase. Similarly,
for mechanical transmission, the survival of the pathogen
on/in the host body part (e.g. skin, hair, mouth, feathers)
exposed to the external environment will determine for
how long the host can play the bridge role.
The second prerequisite is that infectious contacts
must occur along the maintenance-bridge-target trans-
mission chain. These will depend on direct and indirect
(e.g. environmental transmission) contacts, the mode of
transmission of the pathogen, and the site of infection.
The basic reproductive number R0 for the bridge host
(not considering here mechanical transmission) should
be <1 as it cannot maintain the infection but its force of
infection, dependent on the number and extent of infec-
tious contacts with the target host, can be high.
A bridge host that compensates for a lack of infectious
contacts between maintenance and target hosts can op-
erate across different dimensions: spatial, temporal, and
behavioural. The spatial dimension arises when the
bridge host creates a spatial link between the separate
areas in which the maintenance and the target host pop-
ulations occur. This dimension typically refers to the sit-
uations developed below for wild birds and avian
influenza. It has been defined as a “spatial vector” by
Nugent [12] when considering the role of feral pigs
(Sus scrofa) in the epidemiology of bovine tuberculosis
(bTB) in New Zealand.
The temporal dimension arises when the pathogen can
persist (but not be maintained indefinitely) in the bridge
host for a period of time longer than in the maintenance
host or during a distinct season; this has been well
described by Nugent [12] as a “temporal vector”, for
example when red deer (Cervus elaphus) transmit Myco-
bacterium bovis to possum populations that are controlled
to levels that are well under the critical community size
for bTB maintenance.
The behavioural dimension exists when the absence of
contact between sympatric maintenance and target hosts
is compensated for by another host that has infectious
contacts with both. Situations may occur in which the
microhabitat preferences and behaviours of maintenance
and target hosts mean that they do not come into direct
contact despite using the same locations on a daily basis.
Bats, for example, are believed to be the maintenance
host for Ebola, and can be sympatric with people; but
Ebola transmission from bats to humans is enhanced by
the great apes (whose susceptibility to Ebola seems to in-
dicate that they are not maintenance hosts) which feed
with bats and are fed upon by humans [22]. It is interest-
ing to note that in all cases, even a R0 close to zero
(approximating a dead-end host) could still be important
for the transmission function: the capacity to excrete the
pathogen for a few hours, associated with some form of
dispersal, may be sufficient for a bridge host to come
Figure 1 Definition of different target-bridge-maintenance systems (adapted from Haydon et al. [10]). A represents the simplest
maintenance-bridge-target system. In A’, the maintenance and target populations are less connected (frequency/intensity of infectious
contacts) than between the maintenance-bridge-target populations. In B, mitigation strategies aimed at one bridge host cannot fully
control pathogen transmission to the target host because of the alternative bridge host’s pathway. If both maintenance populations were in contact
with both bridge hosts (i.e. if dashed arrows exist), controlling contacts between the target population and bridge hosts should be simpler than other
control options. In B’, according to our definition, Z is not considered as a bridge population as it belongs to the maintenance community. In C, stopping
contacts between the maintenance population and the target population by acting on one of the two bridge hosts would not be enough to stop
transmission, which can still occur through the second bridge host. D is a special case of B, understanding the complexity of the maintenance community
is not necessary to control the pathogen transmission risk to the target population, which can be achieved through the control of arrows connecting the
bridge host. In E, none of the host populations can sustain the infection by itself and according to our definition, u is not considered as a bridge population
as it belongs to the maintenance community. In F, the bridge host connects the target population with another maintenance host creating a system with
a maintenance meta-population, which could change the epidemiological dynamics of the system and the probability of success of intervention strategies
(e.g. vaccination coverage to achieve control of the infection in the target population). G is a special case where two bridge hosts are necessary to achieve
the transmission function. Good knowledge of the ecological interactions in the ecosystem will be necessary to identify such complex interactions between
bridge hosts.
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gens like Ebola, the range of hosts that is classically con-
sidered to be important in disease ecology may have to
be broadened by including hosts that are able to trans-
mit the pathogen over short time- and space-scales.
These hosts are commonly considered as playing no role
in pathogen ecology and are called dead-end hosts (e.g.,
most wild avian hosts for avian influenza virus - AIV -apart from Anseriformes and Charadriiformes). Amongst
the multitude of those dead-end hosts, the bridge host
perspective can identify some that do play a role in disease
ecology.
With this framework in place, we next turn to the ques-
tion of how bridge hosts can be identified in the multi-
host context of AIV epidemiology and suggest an oper-
ational framework (partially implemented in [23]) that can
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and control.
3. A framework to identify bridge hosts for AIV
Waterfowl (defined here as ducks, geese, waders, gulls,
and terns) constitute the maintenance hosts for low
pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIV) [24]. AIV
represent major threats to poultry production when
strains originating from wild birds evolve from low to
high pathogenicity in the poultry (target) populations
[25]. The transmission of LPAIV between the wild bird
maintenance community and domestic populations is
therefore crucial to managing the sanitary and economic
impacts of the disease. In this section, the risk of LPAIV
spillover to poultry populations from the maintenance
populations will be used as an example.
When poultry are confined in farms or buildings, their
direct contacts with the maintenance waterfowl commu-
nity, which mainly lives in wetlands and on coastal
shorelines, are believed to be limited due to spatial seg-
regation between populations. Many outbreaks of highly
pathogenic AIV outbreaks have nonetheless occurred in
domestic poultry production systems. It is therefore sus-
pected that bridge hosts play a role in transmitting
waterfowl-derived strains of AIV to poultry populations.
The ability of wild birds to travel long distances, and
their ubiquity in most habitats, facilitate the potential
for wild bird species to act as bridge hosts. Several con-
straints limit a better understanding of AIV ecology in
bird communities: 1) high host diversity, that can in-
clude several hundred species in a given ecosystem;
2) the costs of diagnostic techniques that limit the num-
ber and type of samples (e.g. cloacal/tracheal swabs,
blood) that can be analysed; and 3) the impossibility of
randomly sampling from bird communities because of
bias in capture techniques (e.g. walk-in traps, mist-nets).
As a consequence, the information available on most
wild bird species is scarce and has been obtained mostly
from by-catch (i.e. captured non-targeted species) of
studies investigating AIV in maintenance waterfowl,
resulting in small sample sizes that are inadequate to
provide epidemiological understanding of the host roles
in AIV ecology in Africa [26]. The following framework
used in a recent study [23] and here developed in detail,
aims at first gathering/collecting available ecological and
epidemiological information; second, at synthesizing this
information to provide a priority list of species that act as
potential bridge hosts; and finally, at undertaking targeted
sampling that can determine the competence of the high
priority species and revisit the framed hypotheses.
The range of methods available to characterize host
competence for AIV and contact patterns between main-
tenance, potential bridge and target host populations is
drawn from the fields of epidemiology and avian ecology(Table 2). None of these methods alone is sufficient to
identify a bridge host in a given ecosystem [9]. Molecu-
lar epidemiology (e.g. gene sequencing after virus isola-
tion) could in principle be used to identify bridge species
but it is very unlikely that related strains from three dif-
ferent host populations (i.e., maintenance, bridge and
target hosts) are concurrently isolated except perhaps
during a localised AIV outbreak. Virological surveillance
(e.g. polymerase chain reaction - PCR techniques) can
provide information about host contacts between poten-
tial bridge and maintenance hosts if data are collected
close to wetlands where waterfowl communities are
known to occur. Serological investigation (e.g. ELISA
tests) can be cheaper than virological testing but provide
less information on the timing of the infection [27,28].
However, a combination of epidemiological and eco-
logical methods could provide the necessary information
to infer the bridge role of a given host population.
Taking into account these constraints, the proposed
framework aims, first, to narrow the large number of
species by ranking the most probable potential bridge
hosts based on proxies of host competence and/or con-
tacts between maintenance, target and potential bridge
hosts. This step can be achieved using (or combining)
available published field (e.g. [24,29-31]) and experimen-
tal epidemiological studies (e.g. [32,33]). However, most
AIV experimental studies have concentrated so far on a
very limited set of species (e.g. for LPAI [32,33] and for
HPAI [34,35]). Reviewing available PCR viral data within
a given area or region can provide information on the
range of host species with a competence for AIV. For
example, in sub-Saharan Africa, the available databases
are poor representations of existing avian diversity (only
10.9% of all African species have been sampled, Additional
files 1 and 2, and only a few species were tested with a
sample size that would be sufficient to detect 1% AIV
prevalence). This exercise can help with ranking the spe-
cies or groups of species based on the rate of infection,
which provides an initial prioritization list for future inves-
tigation (Additional file 1). However, one shortcoming of
PCR data is to link detection of genetic material and state
of infectiousness of the sampled individual [36], an issue
that is often overlooked but particularly important for the
identification of bridge hosts.
The first step of the proposed framework must also in-
corporate ecological data that provide information about
the presence/abundance of potential bridge hosts in the
ecosystem and their potential contacts with maintenance
and target hosts. However, it is a challenge to provide evi-
dence that contacts (1) occur; and (2) result in successful
virus transmission. Different types of data can be used or
collected, each with its own strengths and weaknesses: life
history traits (e.g., abundance, gregarism, foraging and
migratory behaviour) obtained from the literature can be
Table 2 Evaluation of available epidemiological and ecological methods to identify bridge species for AIV according to
their contributions to informing about host competence or contacts, as well as their relative costs (i.e. time and resources)
Host competence Host contacts Resources Examples for AIV
Method Receptivity Replication Excretion Contact/
Maintenance
Contact/Target
Experimental Infection xxx xxx xxx xxx [32-35]
Risk Analysis x x x [41-43]
Serological investigation x x x xx [27,28,30]
Virological investigation xx xx xx xx xx [19,23,24,26,29,31,37]
Telemetry study xxx xxx xxx [39]
Bird ringing and monitoring xx x x [40]
Bird counts xx xx x [8,23,26,41]
Molecular epidemiology xx xx xx xx xx xxx [48,49]
As the number of crosses increases in the first 2 columns the methods provide better ecological or epidemiological information; in the last columns, cost
increases as the number of crosses increases.
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birds or exposure to infection [37,38]; contacts between
wild and domestic birds can be estimated using satellite
telemetry [39]; capture-recapture techniques indicate
population size (e.g. using colour rings at a local scale)
[40]; and observations at focal points that are at wild/
domestic bird interfaces (e.g. around poultry produc-
tion building) can be used to quantify interactions [41].
The second step is to synthesize the ecological and/or
epidemiological data to rank bird species according to
the likelihood that they play a bridge role in the ecosys-
tem under study. Risk analysis can provide such a tool
[38,41-43] and may be particularly important when no
information is available for an ecosystem, or prior to a
field survey, by highlighting the populations that could
be targeted preferentially. Once the bridging potential of
different species has been evaluated, the third step of the
framework consists in testing the host competence of
the most likely bridge hosts in the ecosystem through
targeted sampling. For example, Caron et al. [23] applied
this framework in a southern African ecosystem and
identified bridge hosts by combining bird counts with
selected sampling and PCR testing.
Targeted sampling facilitates the concentration of re-
sources to obtain adequate sample sizes and relevant epi-
demiological information and comes in place of the
practice of blind sampling from wild bird communities,
which is usually biased by capture techniques. Hypotheses
can be revisited iteratively as more is learned about the
potential of highly ranked species to act as bridge hosts.
This approach can also lead to the detection of inconsist-
encies in the initial model (e.g., the definition of the main-
tenance community) and the necessity to revisit it [8].
4. Bridge hosts and other multi-host systems
Avian influenza provides a good example of a case in
which paying conceptual and practical attention to bridgehosts can enhance our understanding of pathogen dynam-
ics in multi-host systems. Although the use of the bridge
host concept may not be relevant for all multi-host sys-
tems, it has the potential to contribute to structuring in-
vestigations on the ecology of emerging pathogens shared
at wildlife/livestock interfaces. To illustrate this point we
present two additional examples of multi-host systems. In
the first, Ebola in West Africa, understanding could be
improved by the use of the conceptual framework devel-
oped here. In the second and better-known system, bovine
tuberculosis in New Zealand, bridge hosts have been iden-
tified and are an important component of the problem.
Ebola virus spilled over in early 2014 in West Africa
from an unknown animal to the human index case.
Knowledge of Ebola ecology is still limited, despite the
first outbreak having being reported in 1976. Current
understanding points at bats (Mammalia: Chiroptera) as
potential maintenance hosts, and contact between humans
and some bat species occurs through the bushmeat indus-
try [44] as well as via bat droppings and occasional cases
of sick bats that are handled by humans [17,45]. However,
embracing the functional approach presented here makes
sense to look for potential bridge hosts that could link
maintenance bats and humans. A priori, scavenging pigs,
dogs, other non-maintenance bat species and wild antelope
can have direct or indirect (e.g. consumption/hunting)
contact with humans [46]. Targeted surveillance of such
species will provide information on their competence for
the virus; and host interaction protocols that identify
contact networks with maintenance and target popula-
tions can provide information on the potential for viral
spread (e.g. [47]). Once the multi-host system is better
understood (case B, C or D in Figure 1), it may be sim-
pler to try to block transmission pathways from bridge
hosts to human populations (e.g. through changes in
behavior related to bridge host consumption by people)
than to control the pathogen in the maintenance hosts.
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oped [17], indicating that domestic horses could be
“bridge hosts” for Hendra viruses between bats (main-
tenance host) and humans (target host) even if it is not
yet known if horses could maintain the virus or just act
as a bridge between bats and humans [17].
As a second example of the utility of the bridge host
framework, Nugent [12] offers a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the bTB multi-host system in New Zealand. The
cattle industry in New Zealand suffers from continuous
spillover of the bTB mycobacterium from the maintenance
host, the brush-tailed possum (Trichosurus vulpecula).
The control of possum populations by depopulation is
mainly implemented in areas around farms that are at
high-risk of transmission to cattle, leaving high densities
of possums in more distant forest and providing a gradient
of bTB prevalence. This apparently efficient strategy is,
however, thwarted by three potential bridge hosts (feral
pigs Sus scrofa, red deer Cervus elaphus, and feral ferrets
Mustela furo) that are involved in transmission (case G in
Figure 1, called “link-host” in the article but lacking a
more conceptual definition). Infected pigs and deer with
large home ranges may leave the forest to die (or be
hunted) around farms, providing an opportunity for fer-
rets to become infected when feeding on carcasses and
subsequently infecting cattle or possums. This study is
particularly interesting for 3 reasons: (1) the complexity
and low probability of the chain of events leading to infec-
tion of the target population do not prevent bTB occur-
rence and the failure of disease control; (2) disease control
targeted at the maintenance population prevents the
transmission link between the maintenance and target
hosts but the transmission pathways built by bridge hosts
(case A’ in Figure 1) reduce the effectiveness of control,
proving the importance of considering this epidemio-
logical function and host role; and (3) the plasticity of the
roles of host populations in disease epidemiology, which is
heavily influenced by the environmental, ecological and
anthropological context.
5. Implications for disease ecology
The concepts of transmission function and bridge host
contribute to a better understanding of disease ecology
in multi-host systems by clarifying the epidemiological
processes that are relevant for disease transmission and
maintenance. This perspective fits better with the way
that people operationalize the complexity theory and
makes it easier to develop models of these systems.
When maintenance and target hosts are not in direct
contact, pathogen transmission relies on successive in-
fectious contacts along the chain of maintenance, bridge
and target hosts. Bridge hosts can play a pertinent and
legitimate role in disease ecology and could become the
targets for surveillance and control for some multi-hostsystems. For example, in some ecosystems, domestic
bird populations are rarely in direct contact with wild
waterfowl populations but phylogenetic analyses have in-
dicated that most precursors of HPAIV in gallinaceous
poultry have originated from wild waterfowl [48], sug-
gesting that bridge hosts play a role in AIV transmission
at the wild/domestic bird interface. More recently, evi-
dence supporting a role for some passerines (finches,
sparrows) in the transmission of the avian-origin human
influenza A (H7N9) to human and poultry in China [49]
suggests a potential role for passerines as bridge hosts
between poultry and humans.
The functional approach emphasizes the need to focus
on transmission pathways between hosts (and their dir-
ectionality) instead of relying solely on intrinsic host
properties (e.g. density, shedding capacity) [50,51]. The
presence of a target host defines directionality in the
transmission processes and implies a network of inter-
connected hosts with different epidemiological roles.
Our framework thus provides a better empirical ap-
proach to some kinds of epidemiological problems, such
as the risk of spread of a specific pathogen towards a tar-
get population or the potential for disease emergence in
emerging disease hotspots.
The maintenance and transmission function concepts
can be related to the roles of vectors in vector-borne dis-
ease ecology. Blood-feeding arthropod vectors that trans-
mit a pathogen between hosts [52] may be involved in
distinct epidemiological functions, including the transmis-
sion function. The term “bridge vector” has already been
used (e.g. [53,54]) to group mosquitoes that transmit West
Nile Virus to humans (here the target population). How-
ever, so far, the distinction between the maintenance and
transmission function has not been properly defined. This
distinction could be important if maintenance and bridge
vectors are different species, opening different control
strategy options (i.e. on the maintenance or on the bridge
hosts).
The identification of bridge hosts for a given pathogen
in a given ecosystem has consequences for disease man-
agement, surveillance and control. Once bridge hosts are
known, managers can adopt mitigation strategies specif-
ically aimed at reducing contact between the target and
the bridge populations. In the case of AIV, this mitiga-
tion can be achieved through strengthening biosecurity
measures or decreasing the quantity of attractors on the
farm (e.g. water sources or open feedlots) [23]. The
adoption of adequate management measures targeting
contacts between maintenance, bridge and target hosts
is also more environmentally acceptable than controlling
(wild) host populations.
The distinction between maintenance and bridge hosts
may under some circumstances be difficult. In the case
of AIV, for example, our current level of knowledge
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contact in some ecosystems between the maintenance
community and the target populations suggest a role for
bridge hosts. The identification of hosts that do not fit
into either maintenance or target host groups, as in [23],
raises two possibilities: either these susceptible hosts act
as bridge hosts, or they may act as previously unknown
maintenance hosts for AIV epidemiology. To differenti-
ate between these two hypotheses may require focused
experimental research, for example by using infection of
captive animals to determine their capacity to maintain
the virus. Other approaches using meta-analysis of exist-
ing data sets have also been proposed [55]. In both
cases, our conceptual framework helps with framing hy-
potheses based on current knowledge and using empir-
ical tests to either confirm these hypotheses or call for a
revision of our understanding of the epidemiological sys-
tem (e.g. this host is not a bridge host and therefore has
no (or another) role in the local context).
Our framework does have some weaknesses. In particu-
lar, proving that a bridge host in a complex multi-host
system where maintenance communities are composed of
numerous interacting populations does not take part in
the maintenance function (i.e. that removing the bridge
host will not drive the pathogen to extinction, according
to Haydon et al. [10]) may necessitate an experimental de-
sign that would be difficult to achieve in practice [9]. In
addition, only cases in which maintenance and target pop-
ulations are not in contact have been considered so far. If
they are loosely in contact (case A’ in Figure 1), the fre-
quency and efficacy of contacts between different pairs
(maintenance-target, maintenance-bridge and bridge-
target) would need to be weighted against each other.
Decreasing the maintenance-target contacts through
management will reveal the relative importance of
bridge-target contacts and could require interventions in
order to efficiently stop pathogen transmission (as in the
case of control of possums for bTB in New Zealand men-
tioned earlier). Finally, we have assumed that a bridge host
must be competent for the pathogen but in some cases
simple mechanical transmission (e.g., a bird carrying the
virus on its feathers [56]) may be possible, relaxing the
prerequisite on host competence for the bridge host.
6. Conclusions
The development of complex human/livestock/wildlife
interfaces, due to the encroachment of human activities
within natural ecosystems, triggers new epidemiological
dynamics that may permit a range of wild or domestic
bridge hosts to link maintenance communities with
new target hosts [57]. We would expect that domestic
species and newly farmed or traded wildlife species will
increasingly play bridge host roles in the emergence of
new zoonoses. The epidemiology of Ebola, SARS, Lymedisease, and H1N1 AIV, for example, are not yet fully
understood but are known to involve multiple hosts.
We believe that introducing our definitions and oper-
ational framework into research and surveillance could
contribute to more efficient use of resources to fill
some knowledge gaps.
Our approach builds on that of Haydon et al. [10]
and refines it to take into account potential circum-
stances under which an extra conceptual development
is necessary. Whether this extra development will be
necessary in many multi-host systems or will be used
only under exceptional circumstances will be answered
by studies to come. The examples given here indicate
that they could be used for at least a few important dis-
eases. The recent appearance in the epidemiological lit-
erature of similar concepts [19,23,38] that are not
always placed soundly within a conceptual framework
and/or ignore previous definitions suggests also the
need for a consolidated review and refinement of these
concepts and definitions. While no individual element
of our proposed framework is new, it is clear from our
discussion above that approaching the problem of un-
derstanding multi-host disease systems from a more
integrated, functional perspective has the potential to
offer a wide range of valuable insights into both epi-
demiology and its applications to pathogen control.
Our approach, which requires both epidemiological and
ecological approaches (and also social science ap-
proaches when the human host is considered) fits well
within current initiatives that call for more transdisci-
plinary integration between the health sciences and
other fields of research.
Finally, the global fight against emerging infectious
diseases is increasingly focused on identifying potential
emerging pathogens from high-risk maintenance hosts
(e.g., bats and rodents, [58,59]). Recent advances in
genetics and genomics have increased drastically the
pace at which new micro-organisms are discovered and
identified [60]. But adding new names to the list of
parasites and pathogens does not provide information
on which of these microorganisms might present a sig-
nificant threat to animal or human health. A mainten-
ance population hosting a large range of potentially
new emerging pathogens does not constitute a threat
for target populations if no transmission route exists
between the maintenance and target populations. Fo-
cusing on pathogen transmission pathways, including
potential hosts bridging the gap between maintenance and
target populations, will help to guide “pathogen hunting”
approaches as functional ecology complements taxonomy.
Such an approach will help to guide high-throughput
sequencing tools towards key hosts within a given epi-
demiological context, increasing the efficiency of surveil-
lance and control efforts.
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